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BACKGROUND OF MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
REVISION*
Katherine S. Spaht**
EARLY ROLE OF LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE
By Act 166 of the legislature of 1938, the Louisiana State
Law Institute was chartered as an official law revision commis-
sion and law reform and legal research agency of the state.'
Officially charged by statute, the Law Institute is "[t]o exam-
ine and study the civil law of Louisiana and the Louisiana
jurisprudence and statutes of the state with a view of discover-
ing defects and inequities and of recommending needed re-
forms," 2 and "[t]o" recommend from time to time such
changes in the law as it deems necessary to modify or eliminate
antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and to bring the law
of the state both civil and criminal, into harmony with modern
conditions. '
In 1948 the Institute was directed by the legislature to
prepare a projet for revising the Louisiana Civil Code,' the last
complete revision having been completed in 1825. Unfortu-
nately, however, the legislature did not appropriate a sufficient
amount of money to insure that such a monumental task would
be undertaken. Not until 1961 did the Institute establish a
Civil Law Section whose ultimate objective was to "accomplish
the general purposes of the Institute in the field of the civil law
of Louisiana. ' ' 5 Even more specifically an enumerated duty of
the Civil Law Section was "[tlo prepare the groundwork for
the revision of the Civil Code of Louisiana."'
* For the text of Act 627 see the appendix to this symposium at 559.
** Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Member of Advisory
Committee to Joint Legislative Subcommittee Revising Louisiana's Community Prop-
erty Laws.
1. 1938 La. Acts, No. 166, § 1, codified in LA. R.S. 24:201 (1950).
2. LA. R.S. 24:204(2) (1950).
3. LA. R.S. 24:204(5) (1950).
4. 1948 La. Acts, No. 335.
5. By-Laws of the Louisiana State Law Institute III(A)(1). The. section's
"ultimate" objectives were to produce a planned civil law doctrine and prepare a projet
or projets for the eventual revision or reformation of the Louisiana Civil Code.
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTrrUTE, LOUISIANA STATE LAW INsTrruTE HANDBOOK 29 (1977).
6. By-Laws of the Louisiana State Law Institute III(A)l(e).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In the early 1970's the Institute received numerous re-
quests for the creation of a committee to study the matrimonial
regimes law of Louisiana and make recommendations for its
revision. Presumably, the particular interest in matrimonial
regimes law revision was precipitated by the United States
Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Reed.7
In Reed the Court held that an Idaho probate statute'
providing for the appointment of an administrator and con-
taining a mandatory provision preferring men over women in
the same entitlement class, was an unconstitutional violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The impact of Reed was not its holding as to the unconstitu-
tionality of the Idaho statutory provision,' but rather the equal
protection analysis applied to statutory classifications drawn
on the basis of sex. Under the equal protection clause, the
Court recognized that states do have the power to .treat differ-
ent classes of persons in different ways.10 However, the four-
teenth amendment does "deny to States the power to legislate
that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a
statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute."" The difference in
treatment must have a "fair and substantial relation to the
object of'the legislation,"'" but in Reed the justification for the
difference in treatment of the sexes, and the objective of the
legislation, was that of "reducing the workload on probate
courts by eliminating one class of contests.' 3 A mandatory
preference on the basis of sex "merely to accomplish the elimi-
nation of hearings on the merits . . ."' is a denial of equal
protection.
In response to the Reed decision and the consequent re-
7. 404 U.S. 7i (1971).
8. IDAHO CODE §§ 15-312 and 15-314.
9. Id.
10. "In applying [the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment],
this Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny
to States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways." 404 U.S. at
75.
11. Id. at 75-76.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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quests, the Executive Committee of the Institute appointed
Professor Janet Mary Riley of Loyola University Law School to
serve as Reporter for revision of Civil Code book III, title VI.
To assist Professor Riley in her undertaking, an advisory com-
mittee was created consisting of Senator Thomas A. Casey,
Katherine Brash Jeter, Helen Kohlman, Thomas B. Lehmann,
Max Nathan, Robert A. Pascal, Eric 0. Person, Robert Rob-
erts, III, and Wayne S. Woody. From 1973 until late 1976, the
Committee met and considered various alternatives. Through-
out this period the Reporter also sought direction from the
Council of the Law Institute as to the policy it desired imple-
mented by the legislation. Reports of the Committee on its
progress were submitted periodically to the Council. The Re-
porter favored equal powers of management of community
property; the members of the Advisory Committee were di-
vided as to the direction revision should take; and the Council
appeared to favor a system "whereby each spouse would exer-
cise control over his or her own earnings."'"
1974 CONSTITUTION
Paralleling Law Institute involvement in the revision of
Louisiana matrimonial regimes law was the enactment of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Article I, section 3, provides:
"No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably dis-
criminate against a person because of. .. sex . . '", In in-
terpreting this constitutional guarantee, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court stated, "[L]egislative classifications [in order to
satisfy equal protection] must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced are treated alike."' 7
15. LoUIsIANA STATE LAW INSTrrUTE, supra note 5, at 31.
16. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
17. State v. Barton, 315 So. 2d 289, 292 (La. 1975). The husband argued that LA.
R.S. 14:74(1) (1950), imposing criminal responsibility upon husbands who refuse to
support their wives, was unconstitutional under article I, section 3. The court, however,
responded:
While it is true that, as noted above, more and more women are abandoning the
traditional role of homemaker in favor of commercial employment, the fact
remains that, at present, the husband is still invariably the dominant or only
19791
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As much as three years after enactment of the constitu-
tion, legislative statutes and jurisprudential rules containing
classification based upon sex consistently were held constitu-
tional under article I, section 3. In each case the court found
that the classification drawn by the statute was reasonable, not
arbitrary, and rested upon some difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation. For exam-
ple, in Williams v. Williams18 the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that article 148 of the Civil Code making alimony avail-
able only for the wife pending suit for separation or divorce had
a rational basis: "Because of the wife's lack of control over her
own earnings. . . and the revenues from the community and
her separate property. . . we believe that it was reasonable for
the legislature to seek to afford her special protection during
the final (and often nonamicable) stage of the community's
existence."" Also representative of the decisions is Broussard
v. Broussard,0 in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, in
dicta, concluded that there was a rational basis for the juris-
prudential maternal preference rule in child custody cases:
"The preference is based on the simple fact that the day-to-day
care of minor children has traditionally, in our society, been in
the hands of mother ,,2 and "[in addition, there is an
obvious biological connexity between mother and child in that
the mother carries the child during gestation, gives birth to it,
and suckles it (in some cases) during infancy." 2
means of support for a couple. In achieving the legitimate state objective of
protecting the welfare of citizens of this state prohibiting the desertion or inten-
tional nonsupport of a wife by a husband, the statute similarly treats the vast
majority of all those similarly situated. Thus, although the classification thus
drawn may be under-inclusive of all supporters of spouses, as drawn it demon-
strates a rational relation between the classification of supporters of spouses as
male and the achievement of a legitimate legislative objective.
315 So. 2d at 292.
18. 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
19. Id. at 441.
20. 320 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
21. Id. at 238.
22. Id. The court added, "A relationship is created which gives, in our opinion,
a biological basis for the historic legal preference given the mother in questions of
custody." Id.
[Vol. 39
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
After Reed and between the years 1973 and 1976, the
United States Supreme Court rendered several sex discrimina-
tion decisions which were carefully examined for guidance on
the issue of what constitutes a rational basis for sex-based clas-
sifications. One of the first such decisions was Frontiero v.
Richardson,2 3 which involved the issue of whether a female
member of the armed services had the right to claim her spouse
as a dependent without proof that he was in fact dependent on
her for one one-half of his support. Male members of the ser-
vice could claim their wives as dependents without such proof
under the statutory scheme. In deciding that such differential
treatment violated the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, the Court concluded that the sole purpose of the statute
was "administrative convenience" based upon empirical data
that "the husband in our society is generally the 'breadwinner'
in the family-and the wife typically the 'dependent' partner
"24
Two years after Frontiero, a statutory scheme which pro-
vided social security benefits to a surviving widow but not to a
widower 25 was challenged as v iolative of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld21 the
Court found the generalization "that male workers' earnings
are vital to the support of their families, while the earnings of
female wage-earners do not significantly contribute to their
families' support"27 archaic. Even though the majority recog-
nized that there was some empirical support for the generaliza-
tion, it found the statutory distinction overbroad and thus not
to be tolerated by the constitution. Furthermore, in examining
the purpose of the statute Justice Brennan emphasized the
"actual" or "articulated" purpose as it emerged from the legis-
lative history of the statute, rather than a "conceivable" or
"hypothesized" one.28 Despite the government's effort to justify
23. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
24. Id. at 681.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1972).
26. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
27. Id. at 643.
28 "This court need not in equal protection cases accept at face value assertions
of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history
19791
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the classification as "benign,"'" the Court found that the actual
purpose was to permit women to elect not to work and to devote
themselves to the care of children. Thus, "[g]iven the purpose
of enabling the surviving parent to remain at home to care for
a child, the gender-based distinction of §402(g) is entirely irra-
tional.' '
Similarly, in 1977 the United States Supreme Court in
Califano v. Goldfarb3 held unconstitutional a gender-based
statutory classification which made payable certain survivors'
benefits to widows, but not widowers, unless a widower had
been receiving at least one-half of his support from his deceased
wife. Relying upon the decisions in Frontiero and Wiesenfeld
and the "actual" purpose of the statute, the Court concluded
that "the differential treatment of nondependent widows and
widowers results not. . . from a deliberate congressional inten-
tion to remedy the arguably greater needs of the .former, but
rather from an intention to aid the dependent spouses of de-
ceased wage earners, coupled with a presumption that wives
are usually dependent. '32
LAW INSTITUTE AD Hoc COMMITTEE
Apparently monitoring the state and federal constitutional
developments in the area of sex discrimination, the legislature
communicated its expectation to the Institute that a proposal
for reformation of Louisiana's community property system be
presented at the 1977 session. In view of this expectation and
the progress of the Institute 'Committee, the Council deemed
it appropriate in late 1976 to create a second committee to
complete the work begun by the first in time for presentation
of a proposal at the 1977 session. Serving on the ad hoc commit-
tee were Judge Adrian Duplantier (Chairman), Jack C. Cald-
demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation."
Id. at 648 n.16.
29. The government argued that the purpose was to compensate female benefici-
aries as a group for the economic difficulties which still confront women who seek to
support themselves and their families. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 776 (9th ed.
1975).
30. 420 U.S. at 651.
31. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
32. Id. at 216-17.
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well, Richard E. Gerard, Katherine B. Jeter, E. H. Lancaster,
Jr., Carlos E. Lazarus, Frank W. Middleton, Jr., Wedon I.
Smith, and Katherine S. Spaht. The work product of the ad
hoc committee, approved by the Council of the Institute for
presentation at the 1977 regular session, essentially retained
the ownership features of community property "but gave each
spouse control over his or her eamings."
JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT IN 1977
Early in 1977 Kirchberg v. Feenstra,3' a federal district
court decision, upheld the constitutionality of Civil Code arti-
cle 2404, which designates the husband as head and master of
the community. Relying on the rationale of Labine v. Vincent,31
the court concluded that Louisiana's community property sys-
tem which allowed the husband to mortgage the home without
the wife's consent did not violate the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. According to the
court, the legal provisions regulating the management of com-
munity property presented no insurmountable barrier 36 to a
wife who wished to exercise greater control over immovables.
The community of acquets or gains could have been eliminated
or modified by marriage contract; 3 thus, the spouses, pre-
sumed to know the law, "tacitly" contracted 3s the community
or partnership of acquets or gains. Furthermore, the wife could
33. LouiSIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 5, at 31.
34. 430 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. La. 1977).
35. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
36. "Similarly [to the facts in Labine], articles 2334 and 2404 did not present
an insurmountable barrier to Ms. Feenstra had she wished to exercise greater control
over the community immovables." 430 F. Supp. at 646.
37. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2325-29.
38. The following quote from an article by Professor Pascal, Updating Loui-
siana's Community of Gains, 49 Tut.. L. REv. 555, 555-56 (1975), appeared in the
Kirchberg opinion:
The community of gains is "super-induced" by every marriage subject to Loui-
siana law only if the spouses either have not entered into a marriage contract,
or have entered into one which does not modify or reject that community regime.
This freedom to modify and reject the community of gains changed the charac-
ter of that regime from one imposed by law to one essentially conventional.
Thus, spouses must be deemed to have contracted tacitly the community of
gains to the extent they have not contracted expressly against it.
430 F. Supp. at 647 (emphasis by the court).
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have filed a declaration preventing the encumbrance without
her consent of community immovables standing in the names
of both spouses.39
Five days later, in a case involving statutory discrimina-
tion against illegitimates,'0 the United States Supreme Court
reconsidered its decision in Labine v. Vincent. Without specifi-
cally overruling Labine, the Court scrutinized the Illinois Pro-
bate Act" more intensely than it had the Louisiana statute in
Labine.' Labelling the "insurmountable barrier" argument
advanced by Illinois as "an analytical anomaly,' 3 the Court
opined, "If the law cannot be sustained on this analysis
[traditional equal protection analysis], it is not clear how it
can be saved by the absence of an insurmountable barrier to
inheritance under other and hypothetical circumstances.""
The state argued that its statute mirrored "the presumed in-
tentions of the citizens of the State regarding the disposition
of their property at death."' 5 The argument proceeded that the
Court must assume that the deceased understood the method
of disposition of his property under the Illinois Probate Act and
that his failure to execute a will and provide otherwise demon-
strated his approval of the provision. Finding it unnecessary to
resolve the question of "whether presumed intent alone can
ever justify discrimination against illegitimates,"l the Court,
39. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2334.
40. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1973). See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 763
n.l.
42. The Court explained:
The Illinois statute can be distinguished in several respects from the Louisiana
statute in Labine. The discrimination in Labine took a different form, suggest-
ing different legislative objectives. . . . In its impact on the illegitimate children
excluded from their parents' estates, the statute was significantly different.
Under Louisiana law, all illegitimate children, "natural" and "bastard," were
entitled to support from the estate of the deceased parent. . . .Despite these
differences, it is apparent that we have examined the Illinois statute more
critically than the Court examined the Louisiana statute in Labine. To the
extent that our analysis in this case differs from that in Labine, the more recent
analysis controls.
430 U.S. at 776 n.17.
43. Id. at 773.
44. Id. at 774 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 775.
330 [Vol. 39
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nonetheless, in a footnote in the opinion, expressed the follow-
ing view:
Even if one assumed that a majority of the citizens of the
State preferred to discriminate against their illegitimate
children, the sentiment hardly would be unanimous. With
respect to any individual, the argument of knowledge and
approval of the state law is sheer fiction. The issue there-
fore becomes where the burden of inertia in writing a will
is to fall. At least when the disadvantaged group has been
a frequent target of discrimination, as illegitimates have,
we doubt that a State constitutionally may place the bur-
den on that group by invoking the theory of "presumed
intent." 7
Obviously, the United States Supreme Court's scrutiny
under the due process and equal protection clauses had
changed significantly from Labine to Trimble, and the federal
district court analysis in Kirchberg, which relied solely upon
Labine, was at the very least suspect. Thus, the relevance of
Trimble to the matrimonial regimes reform was to emphasize
the vulnerability of the managerial scheme of Louisiana's com-
munity property system to successful constitutional attack.
1977 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Although more than two bills incorporating a revision of
Louisiana's community property laws were introduced at the
1977 session, interest focused on House Bill 783 by Representa-
tive Clark Gaudin (on recommendation of the Louisiana State
Law Institute) and House Bill 1278 by Representatives A. J.
McNamara and Diana Bajoie.
House Bill 783, the Law Institute proposal, can best be
described as a reformation of the management features of com-
munity property in the form of a "two-fund system," similar
to that adopted in Texas. 8 Under section 2841 of House Bill 783
each spouse had the exclusive right to administer, encumber or
alienate things produced by his individual effort or skill." Be-
47. Id. at 775 n.16.
48. TEx. FAM. CODE § 5.01-62 (Vernon) (1976).
49. La. H.B. No. 783, § 2841, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977). This section provided:
"Except as otherwise provided in the following articles: A. Each spouse, without the
19791
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cause property earned by either spouse was classified as com-
munity,"0 two separate community funds were created with the
respective powers of management and alienation placed in dif-
ferent spouses, hence its description as a "two-fund system."
As to other community property, administrative powers de-
pended upon in whose name the title to an immovable ap-
peared5 or in whose name movables were registered." In the
case of unregistered community movables, with one excep-
tion,53 powers of administration were placed in the spouse hav-
ing possession at the time of the transaction.54 Other provisions
of House Bill 783 were consistent with the philosophy underly-
ing a "two-fund system"-i.e., enforcement of obligations;55
consent or concurrence of the other, has the right to possession of and to administer,
encumber, or alienate the things produced by his individual effort, skill, or industry
50. La. H.B. No. 783, § 2840, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977). Section 2840 provided:
"Community property includes: (1) Things earned or resulting from the effort, skill,
or industry of either spouse during the existence of a community regime .... "
51. La. H.B. No. 783, § 2842, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977). Section 2842 provided: "Each
spouse, without the consent or concurrence of the other, may administer, encumber,
or alienate a community immovable, when the title thereto is in his name individually.
The consent or concurrence of both spouses is necessary to administer, encumber, or
alienate a community immovable when the title thereto is in the names of the spouses
jointly."
52. La. H.B. No. 783, §§ 2843-44, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977). Section 2843 provided:
Each spouse, without the consent or concurrence of the other, may administer,
encumber, or alienate a community corporeal movable the title registration of
which is provided by law, when the title thereto is registered in his name or in
the names of the spouses in the alternative. The consent or concurrence of both
spouses is necessary to administer, encumber, or alienate such a movable when
the title thereto is in the names of the spouses jointly.
Section 2844 provided:
Each spouse, without the consent or concurrence of the other, may administer,
encumber, or alienate a community incorporeal movable issued or registered in
his name or in the names of the spouses in the alternative. The consent or
concurrence of both spouses is necessary to administer, encumber, or alienate a
community incorporeal movable issued or registered in the names of the spouses
jointly.
53. La. H.B. No. 783, § 2845, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977). Section 2845 provided in part:
"The consent or concurrence of both spouses is necessary to encumber or alienate the
community furnishings contained in the family residence."
54. Id. Section 2845 also stated: "A community corporeal movable the title to
which is not registered, and a community incorporeal movable not issued or registered
in the name of either or both spouses, may be administered, encumbered, or alienated
by the spouse having the possession thereof at the time of the transaction."
55. La. H.B. No. 783, § 2847, 3d Reg. Seas. (1977). Section 2847 stated:
During the existence of the community regime, an obligation of a spouse,
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accounting between the spouses upon dissolution;" and accept-
ance," acceptance with benefit of inventory,58 or renunciation
whether arising before or during the regime, may be enforced only against the
separate property of that spouse, the community property under the sole admin-
istration of that spouse, and, with respect to jointly administered property, the
portion administered by that spouse.
56. La. H.B. No. 783, §§ 2849-52, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977). Section 2849 provided:
Upon dissolution of the community, each spouse shall render to the other
an accounting setting forth both his separate property and the community prop-
erty that was under his administration, the unpaid separate liabilities of the
spouse, unpaid solidary liabilities, and the unpaid liabilities incurred by him
for the common interest of the spouses.
All liabilities incurred by a spouse during a community regime are pre-
sumed to have been incurred for the common interest of the spouses.
Section 2850 provided:
If community property has been used to satisfy a separate debt of one of
the spouses, that spouse shall reimburse the other spouse, upon the dissolution
of the community, for one-half of the community property so used.
If the separate property of one spouse has been used to satisfy a debt
incurred for the common interest of the spouses, the spouse whose property has
been used shall be reimbursed by the other spouse for one-half of such property.
Section 2851 provided:
Upon the dissolution of a community regime, if the separate property of one
spouse has increased in value and such increase is attributable to the uncompen-
sated labor or industry of either spouse, the spouse whose separate property has
thus increased in value shall pay to the other spouse one-half of the increase.
Section 2852 provided:
Upon the dissolution of a community regime, if the separate property of one
spouse has increased in value and such increase is attributable to an investment
of community property, the spouse whose separate property has thus increased
in value shall pay to the other spouse an amount equal to one-half of the value
of the increase, not to exceed, however, one-half of the amount of the community
investment.
If community property has increased in value as a result of an investment
of the separate property of one spouse, the spouse whose property has been used
shall be reimbursed by the other spouse for one-half the value of the increase,
not to exceed one-half the amount of the property so invested.
57. La. H.B. No. 783, § 2854, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977). Section 2854 stated: "A spouse
who accepts simply is personally bound for his portion of the debts incurred by the
other spouse for the common interest of the spouses."
58. La. H.B. No. 783, §§ 2858, 2860, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977). Section 2858 stated:
"A spouse who accepts under benefit of inventory is liable for the debts incurred by
the other spouse for the common interest of the spouses only to the value of his portion
of the property which was under the administration of the other spouse."
Section 2860 stated:
In order to accept with benefit of inventory, a spouse shall petition the court
for the appointment of a notary public to make an inventory of the community
property under the administration of the other spouse, showing the value thereof
as determined by the notary public. The inventory shall also list the unpaid
debts incurred by the other spouse for the common interest of the spouses.
1979]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
of the community."2
In contrast, House Bill 1278 provided for a "one-fund sys-
tem." As between the spouses, this proposal with some notable
exceptions," adopted in principle the right of either spouse to
manage, control and dispose of community property." How-
ever, one provision required joinder for certain transactions, 2
and another article empowered one spouse to the exclusion of
the other to manage, control, and dispose of certain community
property. 3 A separate section of the bill regulated powers of
administration of community property as to third parties."4
59. La. H.B. No. 783, §§ 2855-57, 3d Reg. Seas. (1977). Section 2855 provided:
"A spouse who renounces loses all his right in community property under the adminis-
tration of the other spouse and is exonerated from liability for debts for which the other
spouse is responsible and for which the renouncing spouse is not otherwise responsi-
ble."
Section 2856 stated: "The renunciation does not affect the undivided interest of
the renouncing spouse in the community property under his administration, nor does
it exonerate him from liability for debts incurred by him."
Section 2857 provided: "A creditor of a spouse who is prejudiced by the renuncia-
tion may accept to the extent of his interest in the manner provided for acceptance of
a succession by a creditor."
60. La. H.B. No. 1278, §§ 2352.1, 2353, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977). Section 2352.1
provided:
A spouse who operates or manages a business or an interest in a business, which
is community movable property, has the right to manage, control and dispose
of the business or the interest in the business, subject to the standard of prudent
administration required of a person in a fiduciary capacity.
Section 2353 provided:
Joinder of both spouses is required for alienation, encumbrance, or lease of the
following community assets:
(1) Any immovable property;
(2) Furniture or furnishings in the family home and in use by the family;
(3) Movables that by their nature are for the personal use of the other
spouse;
(4) Movables registered in the names of both spouses; and
(5) Substantial assets of the community by gratuitous inter vivos donation,
that is, a donation wherein there is no direct material advantage to the spouses
or to their community; joinder is not required for customary donations of a value
usual to the economic status of the spouses at the time the donation is made;
61. La. H.B. No. 1278, § 2352, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977). Section 2352 provided:
"Each spouse has the right to manage, control, and dispose of community property,
except where specifically provided otherwise."
62. La. H.B. No. 1278, § 2353, 3d Reg. Seas. (1977). For the text of this section,
see note 60, supra.
63. La. H.B. No. 1278, § 2352.1, 3d Reg. Seas. (1977). For the text of this section,
see note 60, supra.
64. La. H.B. No. 1278, §§ 2357-60, 3d Reg. Seas. (1977). Section 2357 provided:
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Both bills were referred to the House Committee on Civil
Law and Procedure. After a hearing the House Committee took
no action on House Bill 783 but reported favorably on House
Bill 1278. Simultaneously, Senator Thomas Casey introduced
Senate Concurrent Resolution 54, creating a joint legislative
subcommittee, composed of five senators from the Senate
Committee on Judiciary, Section "A," and five representatives
from the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure, to
draft a proposed bill revising Louisiana's community property
laws. The resolution reflected legislative concern that such a
significant change in the law should be made only after careful
deliberation. In the opinion of some legislators more time was
needed to assess the implications of such a reform.
To assist the Joint Legislative Subcommittee, an Advisory
Committee of six persons was to be appointed. One man and
one woman were to be chosen by the president of the Loui-
siana State Bar Association. In addition, the dean of each law
school in the state was to submit the names of one man and
one woman, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate were each to select one man
and one woman from this list.
When the resolution was introduced in the House, it was
amended to direct the Subcommittee to draft a proposal "to
implement the concept of equal management of community
property." Furthermore, the resolution directed that "in order
to accomplish the purposes of this Resolution, [the proposed
bill] shall include a provision to the effect that each spouse
shall have the right to manage, control, and dispose of com-
munity property, except where specifically provided otherwise
"A third party may rely on a spouse's power to alienate, encumber, or lease movable
property registered in the name of that spouse alone."
Section 2358 stated:
A third party in good faith may rely on one spouse's power to alienate, encum-
ber, or lease movable property not subject to registration if it is in that spouse's
possession and is not community furniture or furnishings in the family home and
in use by the family or by its nature for the personal use of the other spouse.
Section 2359 stated: "Joinder of both spouses is required for the alienation, en-
cumbrance, or lease of community immovables unless a declaration to the contrary has
been recorded."
Section 2360 provided: "A transaction between one spouse and a third person not
entitled to rely on that spouse's power as delineated in Articles 2357 through 2359 is
null as to the non-contracting spouse's one-half interest in the property alienated."
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in the proposed bill."
Senate Concurrent Resolution 54, as amended, passed the
House of Representatives. As a result, no action was taken on
House Bill 1278.
JOINT LEGISLATIVE SUBCOMMITTEE
In October, 1977, the following appointments were made
to the Subcommittee created by Senate Concurrent Resolution
54: Senators Joseph Tiemann, Jesse Knowles, Claude Duval,
Jackson Davis and Thomas Casey (Chairman) and Represent-
atives Sam LeBlanc, Frank Simoneaux (Vice-chairman), A. J.
McNamara, Clark Gaudin and Manuel Fernandez. Jack C.
Caldwell and Katherine Brash Jeter were appointed by the
president of the Louisiana Bar Association to serve on the Ad-
visory Committee. From the nominees submitted by the four
law schools in the state, the following were chosen to serve on
the Advisory Committee: Southern University, Raymond Sim-
mons; Tulane University, Cynthia Samuels; Loyola Univer-
sity, George Bilbe; and Louisiana State University, Katherine
Spaht.
At the first scheduled meeting of the Joint Legislative
Subcommittee and Advisory Committee, it was decided that
the Advisory Committee should draft policy alternatives for
consideration by the Joint Legislative Subcommittee. The re-
sponsibility of the Advisory Committee then would be to draft
legislation implementing the policy choices made by the Sub-
committee. In addition, the Law Institute offered the services
of one of its staff members, Evelyn Brooks, who had been as-
signed research responsibilities when the Institute was consid-
ering its community property reform proposal. The first policy
decision made by the Subcommittee, in accordance with the
language of Concurrent Resolution 54, was to adopt in principle
an "equal management" concept of community property.
Thereafter, all policy alternatives to be considered were to be
consistent with the underlying philosophy of equal manage-
ment.
JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS- 1978
During the' period of time in which the Advisory Commit-
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tee and Joint Legislative Subcommittee were working fever-
ishly on an "equal management" reform proposal, several
Louisiana decisions of significance were rendered affecting sex
discrimination and Louisiana's community property system. In
Loyacano v. Loyacano," Justice Dennis, on original hearing,
concluded that if article 160 of the Civil Code only allowed
divorced wives to claim alimony, then the statute would be an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws under
article I, section 3, of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution:
Although not based solely on sex, such classifications for
purposes of entitlement to alimony after divorce probably
were founded on the assumption that all former husbands
have sufficient means for their support, or that few di-
vorced women have property and earnings out of which
alimony could be paid, or upon both. If these propositions
were ever true, common experience tells us that the devia-
tions from them are now too numerous for the classifica-
tions to withstand equal protection challenge."6
Yet, Justice Dennis found that since Louisiana is a civil
law jurisdiction, "the absence of express law does not imply a
lack of authority for courts to provide relief."67 Relying on Civil
Code article 21 and the underlying policy of article 160,8 Jus-
tice Dennis concluded that "a Louisiana court may allow ali-
mony to a husband after divorce, under the same circumstan-
ces in which it can be claimed by the wife, and that the conten-
tion of the defendant-respondent that Civil Code article 160
denies equal protection of the law is without merit." 6
In two court of appeal decisions that immediately followed
Loyacano, provisions of Louisiana's community property sys-
65. 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978).
66. Id. at 307.
67. Id.
68. "The general policy consideration and practical reason which appear to have
induced the legislature to provide alimony after divorce was to prevent divorced
women without sufficient means from becoming wards of the state." Id. at 308.
"Our appeal to natural law and reason informs us that the general policy consider-
ations which induced the legislature to authorize alimony allowances for wives after
divorce would also be served by granting such support to either spouse when the
circumstances provided by Article 160 prevail." Id. at 309.
69. Id. at 309.
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tem were challenged as unconstitutional under article I, section
3. In one case, after examination of the two policy bases for the
"double declaration" requirement of the husband, 0 the First
Circuit concluded there was no rational justification for its
imposition. However, the court felt bound by the Louisiana
Supreme Court's denial of writs in Barnett v. Barnett,7 in
which the constitutionality of the "double declaration" rule
was sustained. In Burger v. Burger,72 the husband argued that
article 2334 of the Civil Code, which provides that the wife's
earnings when living separate and apart are her separate prop-
erty, was unconstitutional. The wife was seeking discovery as
to the salary of the husband for the five-year period during
which they lived separate and apart. Relying on the Louisiana
Supreme Court decision of McMichael v. McMichael,7 3 the
Fourth Circuit held that the husband had to account for bo-
nuses received during this period, but not for his regular salary.
Only if there were "effects" (or property) at dissolution attrib-
utable to these bonuses and the wife sought a partition would
the constitutional issue be properly raised, according to the
court. In such a case, the court postulated that the supreme
court might use extensive interpretation as it had done in
Loyacano and concluded that the principle of article 2334 is
that "the spouse . . . who no longer shares a community life
should not be obliged to divide his or her earnings with the
other spouse.""
By far the most significant case and the one which received
the most media attention was Corpus Christi Parish Credit
Union v. Martin.75 There the husband had executed a mortgage
on the family home to secure an indebtedness contracted for
the benefit of his mother. Being the sole wage earner in the
Martin family, the wife appeared at the credit union and ob-
70. Phillips v. Nereaux, 357 So. 2d 813, 819-21 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978). The two
policy reasons traditionally advanced for imposing the "double declaration" require-
ment have been notice to third parties by recordation in the public records and the
"floating title" theory.
71. 339 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1127 (La.
1977).
72. 357 So. 2d 1178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
73. 251 La. 654, 205 So. 2d 433 ,(1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 871 (1968).
74. 357 So. 2d 1178, 1181 (La. hpp. 4th Cir. 1978).
75. 358 So. 2d 295 (La. 1978).
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jected to the transaction; the response was that there was noth-
ing she could do. Apparently, the transaction resulted in the
ultimate termination of the Martin marriage. When the hus-
band defaulted on the promissory note, the credit union sought
to foreclose by executory process on the mortgage. The wife
sought an injunction claiming that Civil Code articles 2334 and
2404, which permit the husband to bind the community prop-
erty without the wife's consent, are unconstitutional under the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The
district judge concluded that Civil Code article 2404, designat-
ing the husband as "head and master" of the community, was
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
Exactly one week before the legislature convened for the
1978 session, the Louisiana Supreme Court in a four to three
decision reversed the trial court in Martin and held that the
case could have been decided without determining the consti-
tutionality of Louisiana's community property managerial sys-
tem:
Since the statutes have provided a simple and efficient
method for Selina Martin to prevent her husband's mort-
gaging the family home, and since a determination of the
constitutionality of the Louisiana community property
system concerns the basis of property ownership and real
rights in Louisiana, this court should avoid deciding the
case on a constitutional basis unless a decision on the
constitutional question is essential to a decision of the
issues."6
The dissent authored by Justice Tate was as important as the
majority opinion. According to the dissent, article 2404 of the
Civil Code is obviously unconstitutional." Justice Tate sur-
mised that the majority, in view of legislative attention to the
problem, wished to avoid disruption in dealing with
community-held property. To avoid the inherent problems of
declaring article 2404 unconstitutional, Justice Tate suggested
76. Id. at 298.
77. Id. at 302 (Tate, J., dissenting).
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prospective application of the declaration of unconstitu-
tionality:
Since the legislature will soon convene for its 1978
annual session, our declaration of unconstitutionality
would not take effect until the effective date provided by
any laws enacted by this session . . . which regulate the
administration, sale, mortgage, or other transaction by
the spouses with regard to property acquired by the com-
munity.
If the legislature during the session fails to enact legis-
lation purporting to end the unconstitutionality of Articles
2334 and 2404,. . . then as of the sixtieth day after final
adjournment of this session. . . we would hold Civil Code
Articles 2334 and 2404 are invalidated as unconstitutional,
insofar as permitting the husband alone to sell, mortgage,
or lease community immovable property of which the title
is in the name of both spouses. 8  .
Thus, the stage was set for the 1978 session of the legislature
and its consideration of the work product of the Joint Legisla-
tive Subcommittee, House Bill 1132.
1978 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
As originally introduced, the Subcommittee's "equal man-
agement" bill was somewhat different from the final version
contained in Act 627. In May, after House Bill 1132 had been
referred to the House Committe on Civil Law and Procedure,
it was redrafted merely in an attempt to make its language
more consistent with that of the Louisiana Civil Code. Sub-
stantively, there was intended to be no change in the original
work product of the Subcommittee. Both the original version
and the redraft contained the essential features which appear
in Act 627.
As to management of community property, the Act adopts
as a basic principle the ability of either husband or wife to
administer, encumber, and alienate community property. To
this basic principle, however, there are two general categories
of exceptions: instances of joint management (consent of both
78. Id. at 303-04 (Tate, J., dissenting).
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husband and wife is necessary) and instances of sole and exclu-
sive management (one spouse has exclusive management of
community property).
Because certain transactions are felt to be of such impor-
tance to the well-being of the family, the Act requires concur-
rence of the spouses for those transactions.79 By amendment on
the House floor, Act 627 provides a method for obtaining in
advance consent for two of the transactions which require con-
currence: "A spouse may expressly confer upon the other
spouse the sole and irrecovable right to alienate, encumber, or
lease a community immovable or a community business or all
or substantially all of the assets of a community business.' ' 8 As
explained in the comment, "[t]he right conferred may be ir-
revocable although no consideration is given"; and "[t]he
right conferred and the revocability of the right may be of
unlimited duration, for a definite period of time, or until the
happening of an uncertain or certain event."
In order to facilitate commerce, the legislature felt that as
another exception to the basic principle of "equal manage-
ment," certain community property should be managed exclu-
sively by one spouse. In Act 627 there are three instances of sole
and exclusive management of community property: (1) aliena-
tion and encumbrance of the movable assets of a business man-
aged by one spouse "without the participation in management
79. LA. R.S. 9:2843 (Supp. 1978):
The alienation, encumbrance or lease of the following property, except en-
cumbrances created by operation of law, requires the concurrence of the spouses:
(1) Community immovables;
(2) Community furniture or furnishings in use in the family home;
(3) A community business or all or substantially all of the assets of the
business;
(4) Movables when issued to or when registered as provided by law in the
names of the spouses jointly.
The concurrence of the spouses is also necessary for the donation of com-
munity assets, except in cases of usual or customary gifts of a value commensur-
ate with the economic status of the spouses at the time of the donation.
80. Id. At the Subcommittee hearing held September 6, 1978, the Advisory Com-
mittee suggested that this provision of Act 627 be amended at the 1979 session of the
legislature to read as follows: "A spouse may expressly and irrevocably waive the
necessity for concurrence to the alienation, encumbrance or lease of a community
immovable or a community business or all or substantially all of the assets of a com-
munity business."
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of the other";8' (2) alienation and encumbrance of movables
issued or registered in the name of one spouse;82 and (3) by
amendment on the House floor, alienation and encumbrance,
by a spouse who is a partner, of the accompanying partnership
interest. 3
Under Act 627, remedies do exist if the power to alienate
or encumber community property is abused. One spouse is lia-
ble to the other for fraud or bad faith in the management of
community property. 4 If one spouse is guilty of fault, incom-
petence, neglect or bad faith in the management of community
property, the other can demand a judicial separation of prop-
erty.88 The alienation or encumbrance of community property
by one spouse without the right to do so is voidable by the
other.8 6
While generally the classification of property as either
separate or community is not altered significantly, 7 two major
changes in classification concerning personal injury recoveries
and fruits and revenues from separate property are instituted.
As to personal injury recoveries, Act 627 classifies the portion
of the award compensating for injury to the person as the sepa-
rate property of the injured spouse."8 Yet, the portion of the
award attributable to loss of earnings is community property."
As to fruits and revenues of separate property, they are classi-
fied as community0 until the spouse files an authentic declara-
81. LA. R.S. 9:2844 (Supp. 1978), provides:
A spouse who manages a community business without the participation in man-
agement of the other has the sole right to acquire, encumber, alienate or lease
the movable assets of the business but cannot exercise this right alone if the
encumbrance, alienation or lease comprises all or substantially all of the mov-
able assets of the business or affects movables issued or registered in the name
of the spouses jointly or the name of the other spouse alone, as provided in R.S.
9:2843 and R.S. 9:2845.
82. LA. R.S. 9:2845 (Supp. 1978), provides: "A spouse in whose name movables
are issued or registered as provided by law has the sole right to manage them, encum-
ber, lease or alienate, them."
83. LA. R.S. 9:2844 (Supp. 1978), provides: "A spouse who is a partner has the
sole right to alienate, encumber or lease the accompanying partnership interest."
84. LA. R.S. 9:2846 (Supp. 1978).
85. LA. R.S. 9:2856(A) (Supp. 1978).
86. LA. R.S. 9:2846 (Supp. 1978).
87. See generally LA. R.S. 9:2838-39 (Supp. 1978).
88. LA. R.S. 9:2840 (Supp. 1978).
89. Id.
90. LA. R.S. 9:2838(5) (Supp. 1978).
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tion reserving the fruits and revenues as separate property.
After such an act is filed for registry, the fruits and revenues
are classified as separate." Present ownership of property clas-
sified as community is not changed: "Each spouse owns a pres-
ent undivided one-half interest in the community property. ' ' 2
Another significant alteration made by Act 627 concerns
obligations contracted by either husband or wife: "Obligations
incurred by a spouse before or during the community regime
may be satisfied from the community and from the separate
property of the spouse who incurred the obligation.' 3 Without
detailing the changes made in present community property
law, Act 627 does provide for different options than presently
exist on dissolution of the community;" and different rules
governing reimbursement between the spouses upon dissolu-
tion ."
On January 1, 1980, the substantive legislative changes in
Louisiana's community property system outlined above will
take effect as to all persons presently married, except those
with an express marriage contract. The provisions of Act 627
will not affect the characterization of assets or fruits or reve-
nues accruing prior to January 1, 1980, or the validity of any
act or transaction made prior to January 1, 1980."
In addition to substantive changes in the community prop-
erty system, the Act contains provisions which remove the con-
tractual incapacities of husband and wife 7 and which expand
the rights of the spouses to sue each other during marriage."
These provisions, to become effective sixty days after final ad-
journment of the 1979 legislative session, proved to be the most
controversial. The Subcommittee's proposal on the right of the
spouses to sue each other during marriage was phrased in terms
of full freedom to sue with one exception-damages for per-
sonal injury resulting from an unintentional offense or quasi
91. LA. R.S. 9:2839(5) (Supp. 1978).
92. LA. R.S. 9:2838 (Supp. 1978).
93. LA. R.S. 9:2841 (Supp. 1978).
94. LA. R.S. 9:2849-52(D) (Supp. 1978).
95. l A. R.S. 9:2852(E)-2854 (Supp. 1978).
96. 1978 La. Acts, No, 627, § 9.
97. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 3.
98. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 4.
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offense." In the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure,
however, the provision was amended to restore the same prohi-
bitory language that presently appears in Revised Statutes
9:291,'°0 but with four additional exceptions.'0 ' With respect to
the spouses' ability under Act 627 to change their matrimonial
regime by contract at any time during marriage, there was an
attempt at each stage in the legislative process to amend sec-
tion 2834 and only allow the prospective spouses to so contract
before marriage, which is presently the law.'0 2 All such at-
tempts to amend Act 627 were unsuccessful, but in Concurrent
Resolution 232 the concern of legislators regarding ability of the
spouses to change their matrimonial regime contract at any
time is evident.'03
Since none of the provisions of Act 627 go into effect before
September, 1979, Concurrent Resolution 232 was passed to pro-
vide a mechanism for interim study by the Joint Legislative
Subcommittee and Advisory Committee. The resolution con-
templates Law Institute scrutiny of Act 627 and suggestions for
99. La. H.B. 1132, § 4, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
100. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 4, provides: "As long as the marriage continues
and the spouses are not separated judicially, husband and wife may not sue each other,
except for ... .
101. Id.
As long as the marriage continues and the spouses are not separated judicially,
husband and wife may not sue each other, except for:
(1) enforcement of a lawful conventional obligation;
(2) a loss sustained as a result of fraud or bad faith in the administration
of the community property by the other spouse;
(3) avoidance of an unauthorized alienation, encumbrance or lease of com-
munity property;
(4) judicial authorization to act without the consent of the other spouse
Id.
102. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329.
103. La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 232, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978) provides:
WHEREAS, the members of the Legislature have expressed concern about
the extent to which spouses should be authorized to contract with each other
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Law Institute is authorized and
directed to submit a proposal which would vest the spouses with unlimited right
to contract with each other, a proposal which would vest the spouses with the
right to contract with each other in specified instances, and a proposal which
would prohibit all contracts between spouses.
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amendments at the 1979 session of the legislature. 4 Specifi-
cally, the Institute is directed to prepare alternative proposals
on the spouses' right to contract during marriage. 05 In addi-
tion, under the resolution, the Louisiana Bar Association is
encouraged to conduct seminars throughout the state to inform
members of the Bar about the provisions of Act 627.106 Activity
during this interim year of study is the subject of the last sec-
tion of this symposium.
104. La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 232, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978) further provides:
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Louisiana Law Institute is author-
ized and directed to review the provisions of House Bill No. 1569, the statutes
and codes of the state of Louisiana and to make such recommendations, propos-
als, and codifications as it deems necessary to achieve the policy objectives set
forth in House Bill No. 1569 by the Legislature and to review proposed legisla-
tion which may be prepared pursuant to this resolution for the purpose of assur-
ing that such proposed legislation utilizes the style and semantics appropriate
for inclusion in the Civil Code and the statutes.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Louisiana Law Institute shall
report all recommendations, proposals, and codifications to the joint subcom-
mittee at least thirty days prior to the convening of the 1979 Regular Session of
the Legislature.
105. See note 103, supra.
106. La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 232, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978) provides:
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Louisiana State Bar Association is
encouraged to conduct public meetings, conferences or seminars for the purpose
of disseminating information relative to the provisions of House Bill No. 1569,
receiving recommendations or proposals with respect thereto from the judiciary,
lawyers, and other members of the public, and transmitting such recommenda-
tions or proposals to the Louisiana Law Institute and the joint subcommittee
on or before February 1, 1979.

